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OPTIMAL DESIGN OF A QUASI-REDUNDANT
PROTECTIVE SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR REACTORS
J.M. Kontoleon*
ABSTRACT
In many instances protective systems used in
nuclear reactors are quasi-redundant systems; each of
a number of safety channels feeds a number of
independent protective units. A reactor shutdown is
initiated if more than a specified number of units are
in favour of shut down. The objective is to achieve a
very high reliability at a reasonable cost. An
analysis is presented to obtain the reliability, fail-
safe and fail-danger probabilities of a quasi-
redundant system. Three algorithms are given for:
(a) the design of a quasi-redundant system having the
maximum reliability subject to a cost constraint,
(b) the optimal design satisfying a given reliability
level at the minimum cost and
(c) the optimal design satisfying a combined safety
requirement at the minimum cost. The algorithms are
illustrated by way of examples.
1. Introduction
The major objectives of every design of a reactor
protective system is to achieve a low probability of
failure to initiate the protective action and a low
probability of the occurrence of any spurious
protecton action. In most instances, the methods used
to achLieve the first objective, cause a deviation from
the second one and vice versa1. As a consequence, the
design must be "optimal", in the sense that it should
involve a compromise between the desired objectives,
and satisfy the imposed techno-economical constraints.
To achieve the desired objectives, redundancy is
commonly used. The usual type of redundancy is to
connect n units so that to obtain a m-out-of-n:G
system; the protection action is initiated when a
coincidence of m or more unit trips occurs. If m=1,
then the probability of a reactor spurious trip is
maximum; if m=n, then the probability that the
protective system will initiate the protection action
is minimum. Thus, the proper selection of m, n will
give a compromise between the desired design
objectives of the m-out-of-n:G system. In the case of
a dynamic redundant system2, this compromise can be
achieved by adjusting the frequency of scanning of the
redundant units.
This paper presents an analysis of a quasi-
redundant reactor protective system and develops three
algorithms which result in the optimal design of such
systems. The quasi-redundant system3, is neither with-
out redundancy nor with parallel redundancy and is
shown in Figure 1. It can be seen that each of the
safety channels (a channel involves the sensor and the
safety line) is connected to a number of protective
units (e.g., reactor temperature rate trip-amplifier
units); if there are J channels and M units per
channel, then the protective action is initiated when
K-out-of-J-M units vote in favour of the protective
PRO{E
Figure 1. J-M-K Quasi-Redundant System
action. Reference 3 analyses the reliability of such a
system when each channel and unit are either good or
bad. In this work, three states are considered for each
channel and unit (good, fail-safe and fail-danger) and
the objectives are:
(a) to obtain the optimum J, M, K which result in the
maximum reliability subject to a cost constraint;
(b) to obtain the opt!rn'lm J, M, K in order to achieve
a specified level of reliability at minimum cost; and
(c) to obtain the optimum J, M, K resulting to a
reliability level above a specified one and to a fail-
danger probability below a specified level, at the
minimum cost.
Following the notation given in the next section,
the reliability, fail-to-safe and fail-to-danger
probabilities of a quasi-redundant system are obtained.
These are further used in the formulation of three
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computer algorithms to solve the above described
problems.
2. Notation and Assumptions
number of safety channels
number of protective units per channel
minimum number of votes to initiate the
protective action
total number of units; N a J.M
unit fail-to-safe probability of failure
unit fail-to-danger probability of failure
channel fail-to-safe probability of
failure
channel fail-to-danger probability of
failure
reliability of the protective system
fail-to-safe probability of the protective
system
fail-to-danger probability of the
protective system
capital cost involved in a channel
unit capital cost
(i) All safety channels are good or FS, and (N-K+1)-
out-of-N units are FD: or
(ii) j safety channels are FD, and at least m-out-
of-jM units are good or FD, and at least
(N-K+l-m)-out-of-(J-j)M units are FD. Then,
Qd(J,M,K) = (l-qdd) E (N)
m=N-K+l/
m N-m
ud(l-qud)
+ E ( [M-m
+
J=j
ij qcd(l-qcd) (1-q5s)m qus
(J-j)M
(r=N-K+I-m
(c) Reliability
It is,
R = 1 - QS(J,M,K) Qd(J,M,K)
(2)
(3)
C(J,M) protective system cost; C(J,M) S J.cc
+ N.cu
C
FS, FD
[x] *
cost constraint
denotes fail-safe and fail-danger channel
or unit failure, as stated in the text
integer part of x
The following assumptions are made throughout the
paper:
1. Safety channel and unit states are s-independent
2. Safety channels and units can be in one of the
following three states: good, fail-to-safe and
fail-to-danger.
3. A failed channel or unit cannot become good or
change mode of failure.
3. Fail-Safe and Fail-Danger Analysis
(a) Fail-safe probability
The quasi-redundant system will cause a spurious
reactor trip in the following cases:
(i) All safey channels are good or FD, and at
least K-out-of-N units are FS; or
(ii) j safety channels are FS, and at least
m-out-of-jM units are good or FS, and
at least (K-m)-out-of-(J-j)M units are
FS; m=O,l,...,)jM, j=~1,2,...,$J.
The above give,
Qs(J,M,K) = (1-qcs) E (m) qus (1-qus)
+ .2 (j qcs (1-qcs) Xi [( (1-qud)m qud
(1)( J-r) qrs (I-qus)( i)M)r
(a) Fail-danger probability
The system will be in the fail-to-danger state if:
4. Optimal Design Subject to a Cost
Constraint
Consider the problem of maximising the reliability
of a quasi-redundant system, subject to a given cost
constraint, C. It is required to find the optimum
values of J, M and K (Jopt, Mopt and Kopt), such that
R(Jopt, Mopt, Kopt) = maxR(J,M,K), for C(Jopt, Mopt) C
(4)
There are two extreme cases in the design of a
quasi-redundant system, under the condition imposed by
(4):
(i) J=1; then, M takes its maximum value, Mmax
Mmax = [(C-cc) /cu]
(ii) M=1; then, J takes its maximum value, Jmax
Jmax = [C/(cc + cu)] (6)
Considering the above two extreme cases, it is
reasonable to start with the one which gives the
higher reliability and then modify the design until the
maximum reliability is obtained. The algorithm is as
follows:
Algorithm A
Steps:
0. Read qcs, qcd, qus, qud, CC, Cu and C.
1. Obtain Jmax and Mmax' If Jmax = Mmax = 1,
then set Kopt = 1, Rmax = R(1,1,1) and go to
step 25; otherwise continue.
2a. Set Rmax = O, k = 0.
b. Set k+k+1
3. Evaluate R(1, Mmax, k); if R(l, Mmax, k) Rmax,
then go to step 5a, otherwise go to step 4.
4. Set Rmax = R(1, Mmax, k), K1 = k; go to step 2b.
5a. Set R(1, Mmax, K1) = Rmaxs Rmax = 0, k =
b. Set k÷k+l
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6. Evaluate R(Jmax, 1, k); if R(Jmax, 1, k) < Rmax,
then go to step 8a, otherwise go to step 7.
7. Set Rmax = R(Jmax, 1, k), K2 = k; go to step 5b.
8a. Set R(Jmax, 1, K2) = Rmax, k = 0.
b. If R(1, Mmax' K1) 2 Rmax, then go to step 9a;
otherwise go to step 17a.
9a. Set Rmax = R(1, Mmax5 K1), J = 1, Kopt = K1,
M = Mmax and i = 0.
b. Evaluate x = C - C(J,M)
c. Set i4-i+l; if i>M-1, then go to step 25 other-
wise continue.
10a. Evaluate y = (J.cu.i+x)/(cc + (M-i)cu)
b. If y . 1, then set J*-J+[y] and go to step Ila;
otherwise go to step 9c.
lla. Set Rmax = 0.
b. Set k*-k+l
12. Evaluate R(J, M-i, k); if R(J, M-i, k) i Rmax,
then go to step 14 otherwise go to step 13.
13. Set Rmax = R(J, M-i, k), K, = k and go to step
lib.
14. If Riax > Rmax, then go to step 15; otherwise
go to step 16a.
15. Set 1M4--i, i=0, Rmax = Rmax, Kopt = Kl, and go
to step 9b.
16a. Set Jopt = J[Y]*, Mopt = M.
b. Evaluate C(Jopt, Mopt) and go to step 26.
17a. Set J = Jmax, M = 1, Kopt = K2 and i=0.
b. Evaluate x = C - C(J,M).
c. Set i-<i+l; if i>J-1, then go to step 25
otherwise continue.
18a. Evaluate y = (M1cu.i + cc.i + x)/(J-i)cu
b. If y 2 1, then set M4-14+[y] * and go to step 19a;
otherwise go to step 17c.
19a. Set Raax = 0
b. Set k÷k+1
20. Evaluate R(J-i, M, k); if R(J-i, M, k) < Rmax,
then go to step 22, otherwise go to step 21.
21. Set Rmax = R(J-i, M, k), K2 = k and go to step
19b.
22. If Rmax > Rmax, then go to step 23; otherwise
go to step 24.
23. Set JvJ-i, i=0, Rmax = Rmax, Kopt = K2 and go to
step 17b.
24. Set Mopt = M-[y]*5 Jopt = J and go to step 16b.
25. Set Jopt = J5 Mopt = M and obtain C(Jopt, Mopt).
26. Print Jopt, Mopt, Kopt5 Rrnax and C(Jopt, Mopt);
terminate the programme.
Example 1
Let qcs =
cc = 3, cu = 1
algorithm A it
0.05, qcd = 0.02, qus = 0.1, qud = 0.07;
and C = 15 capital units. Following
is:
Step:
0 - 1 : Jmax = 3, Mma = 12
2 - 5a: K, = 7, R(1, 12, 7) = 0.9299
5b- 8a: K2 = 2, R(3, 1, 2) = 0.9244
9a- 9b: Rmax = 0.9299, x _ 0
9c-10 i=l, y = 1/14 < 1
i=2, y = 2/13 < 1
i=7, y = 7/8 < 1
i=8, y = 8/7 > 1, [y]* = 1
11 -14 Riax = R(2, 12-8, 6) = 0.9416
M = 4
Rmax = 0.9416
9b x=l
9c-10 i=l, y = 3/6 < 1
i=2, y= 1, [y]* = 1
11 -14 Rmax = R(3, 4-2, 4) = 0.9683
M = 2
Rmax = 0.9683
9b x=0
9c-10 : i=l, y = 3/4 < 1
i=2 > M-l=l
25 Jopt = 3, Mopt = 2, Kopt = 4
Rmax = 0.9683, C(3,2) = 15.
5. Specified Reliability at Minimum Cost
The problem posed in this section is to achieve a
given reliability Rg, at minimum cost; i.e., it is
required to obtain Jopt, Mopt and Kopt such that
C(Jopt, Mopt) = min, for
R(Jopt, Mopt, Kopt) > Rg
(7)
(8)
Consider the case of the simplest possible design,
i.e., J=1, M=1; if (8) is satisfied, then this is the
optimal design since (7) is satisfied. In general (8)
will not be satisfied for the case of the simplest
design, and therefore the design should be adjusted
sytematically until both (7) and (8) are satisfied.
Algorithm B is used to obtain the optimal design for
the present problem (it includes algorithm A).
Algorithm B
Steps:
0. Read qcs, qcd, qus, qud, RgV cc, cu.
1. Set J=1, M=1 and K=1. If R(J, M, K) 2 Rg, then go
to step 6; otherwise continue to step te
2a. If cc < cu, then set w = cc; otherwise set w = cu.
b. Set C = cu + CC
3. Set C+-C + w
4. Use algorithm A to obtain Jopt' Mopt, Kopt and
Rmax.
5. If Rmax 2 Rg, then go to step 7; otherwise go to
step 3.
6. Set Jopt = J, Mopt = M, Kopt = K.
7. Print Jopt, Mopts Kopt and C(Jopt, Mopt);
terminate the programme.
Example 2
Let qcs = 0.06, qcd = 0.04, qus = 0.12, qud = 0.08,
cc = 2, cu = 1 and Rg = 0.89; following algorithm B
it is:
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Step:
0 - 1 : R(1, 1, 1) = 0.7200
2a- 2b: w=l
C=3
3 : C=4
4 - 5 : Jopt = 1, Mopt = 2, Kopt = 2
Rmax = 0.7488
3 : C=5
4 - 5 : Jopt = 1, Mopt
Rmax = 0.8479
3 : C=6
4 - 5 : Jopt = 1, Mopt
Rmax = 0.8634
= 3, Kopt = 2
= 4, Kopt = 3
3 : C=7
4 - 5 Jopt = 1, Mopt = 5, Kopt = 4
Rmax = 0.8830
3 : C=8
4 - 5 Jopt = 1, Mopt = 6, Kopt = 4
Rmax = 0.8901
7 Jopt = 1, Mopt = 6, Kopt = 4
C(1,6) = 8.
Algorithm B can be easily improved by adding an
acceleration parameter in step 3; this will cause C
to increase quickly until Rmax > Rg; when Rmax > Rg,
the value of C is reset to that of the previous step,
and the acceleration parameter is reset to 1. The
process terminates when the reliability level is
achieved for a cost C(Jopt, Mopt) and it is not
achieved for C(Jopt - Mopt) - w.
6. Combined Safety Requirements
Consider the design of a quasi-redundant
protective system satisfying two requirements; for
example, let one requirement be to achieve a
reliability above a specified level Rg, and the other
to achieve a fail-to-danger probability below a
specified level Qg. Both the above requirements should
be achieved at the minimum possible cost. The
previous algorithms can be used to solve the present
problem. Algorithm B (includes algorithm A) can be
easily modified as follows:
Algorithm C
Steps:
0. : As step 0 of algorithm B; read Rg, Qg.
1-4 : As steps 1-4 of algorithm B.
5a. : If Rmax > Rg, then go to step 5b; otherwise
go to step 3.
b. : Set k=O,R = 0 and Q' = 1.
c. : Set k*-k+l
d. : Evaluate A = R(Jopt, Mopt, k) and
B = Qd(Jopt, Mopt, k); if A 2 Rg and B< Qg,
then go to step 7; otherwise go to step 5e.
e. : If A < R(Jopt, Mopt, k-i) or B < Qd(Jopt'
Mopt, k-i), then go to step 3; otherwise go
to step 5c.
Example 3
Let
used in
it is:
Step:
Rg = 0.945, Qg = 0.003 and assume the parameters
Example 2. Following the steps of algorithm C
R(Jopt,lMoptgk) Qd(Jopt,Moptqk)
0 -5b : Jopt=3, Mopt=3,
Kopt=5
Rmax=09579
Sc-5e : k=l
k=2
k=3
k=4
3 -5b : Jopt=3 Mopt=4,
Kopt=7
Rmax=0.9691
5c-5e : k=l
k=2
k=3
k=4
k=5
k=6
3 -5b : Jopt=4 Mopt=29
Kopt=S
Rmax=0.9711
5c-5e: k-i
k=2
k=3
k=4
7 : Jopt=4 Mopt=2,
0. 2629
0.5868
0.7783
0.9018
0. 1791
0.4723
0.6941
0.8099
0. 8962
0.9526
0. 2814
0.6018
0. 8377
0.9460
=0.
0.0001
0.0006
0.0033
'0.
=0.
0.0001
0.0006
0.0024
0.0053
=0.
=0.
0.0004
0.0029
Kopt=4
R(4,2,4) = 0.9460> Rg
Qd(4,2,4) = 0.0029< Qg
7. Conclusions
The use of the developed algorithms allows the
design of quasi-redundant systems to satisfy the
desired safety characteristics. The algorithms
presented have been implemented in FORTRAN IV and a
number of design problems have been solved. By
letting either qcs = qcd = 0, the results are applicable
to conventional K-out-of-N:G systems.
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